

AN
APPENDIX
TO A
LETTER
To the Reverend
Mr. NORMAN.

In TWO PARTS.

SHEWING,

First, That the Eternal Certainty of Contingent
Events cannot be proved ; but that the Con-
tradiction to it is true and demonstrable.

Secondly, That the several Arguments, Whether from
Reason or Revelation, offered by the Rev. Mr. Bliss,
Mr. Norman, and the nameless Author, in Defence
of it, are Weak and Inconclusive.

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THE APPENDIX.

Part the First.

AT the End of my Letter to Mr. Norman I made the Controversy between us to lie chiefly in these *three Things*.

First, Whether any Events were *eternally certain*, without a *Decree* to make them so ?
Secondly, Whether God *foreknew* from *Eternity* that all the *Sins* of the *Creature* would *certainly be*, and *yet never decreed* they *should be* ?

Thirdly, Whether any Events can be both *future* and *contingent*, at the same time ?

All which the Gentlemen, who have wrote against me, *affirm*; and I *deny*.

Upon the *last Point* in *Difference*, I observed, did depend the *other Two*. Because, if there be no Events *contingent*, and yet *certain*, it can be no Dispute, Whether any *contingent* Events were *eternally certain* without a *Decree*? Or, Whether they could be *known* to be so, but in the *Decree*? Since upon this

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Supposition they will not be *certain at all*, and therefore cannot be known to be *certain*.

And then I concluded my Letter with these Words ; so that you see, Sir, the Debate between us may be reduced to this *single Question*,

Whether it can be true of the same Event, at the same time, both that it WILL BE, and yet MAY NOT BE ? Or, in other Words ;

Whether there be any such Things as FUTURE or CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES ?

I instanced in *Adam's Fall* ; Whether it could be both *ever true*, that he *would fall* ; and yet *really true*, that he *might have prevented* his Fall ? My Opinion was, There is a *Necessity* either to deny the *real Possibility* of his *standing* ; or to deny the *eternal Certainty* of his *Falling*. As the *Affirmative* is what they hold in *both*, the Proof lies at their Door : Yet I design'd (I told Mr. N.) an *Appendix* to my Letter, in which I should endeavour to evince, That *their Side* of the Question *could not be proved* ; nay, that the *Contradiction* to it was *true and demonstrable*.

To which he replys, in an *Appendix* to his own Letter, " Let this be once made out, and " all the World must soon be of my Opinion ; " nor need I then be afraid of meeting with " any Opposition to what I call my *main Answer.*"

This therefore I shall now apply my self to.
To shew,

First,

First, That the *Affirmative* cannot be proved; *viz.* That a Thing can be both *future*, and yet *contingent*; Or, What will certainly be, and yet may never be.

There are *six* different *Ways*, whereby *Truth* may be let into the *Mind*. These are usually distributed into that of *Sense*, *Consciousness*, *Intelligence*, *Inspiration*, *Faith*, and *Reason*.

The Dictates of *SENSE* relate only to *outward* and *present* Objects, such as are *united* unto the *Organ*: But what *will be* is something *absent* and *to come*.

So again, we are *conscious* of Nothing but of what is *present* and *within us*; and so, that we *feel* by a kind of *inward Sensation*: But what *will be* is something *without us*, removed to a *Distance* from us, and is utterly incapable of such an *Union*.

INTELLIGENCE is another Way by which we come at *Truth*: And thus we judge of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*, or of the Terms of a *Proposition*, by their own *intrinsick* and *immediate Evidence*: But that *any can prevent what will be*, is not to be known by such an *intuitive View*. The very Disputes which are about it, shew that it is *no Maxim* or *first Principle*.

For my own Part, I have view'd the *Terms* round and round again, and the *Truth* of the *Proposition* is so far from being *self-evident*, that the bright and convincing *Evidence* is wholly on the *other side*.

INSPIRATION is what, I presume, none will pretend unto. As for my self, I must, I own, utterly disclaim this *superior* and *heavenly* Evidence of *any* Truth. If any should challenge it, and lay, that it is by this Sort of Light and Impression they come to know, that some Events are both *future* and *contingent*, what *will be* and yet *may not be*, let them produce their *Credentials*, and prove the *Revelation Divine*, and the Work is done.

Then as to the Evidence of *Faith*; this, you know, arises wholly from *Testimony*. Now *Testimony* is either *Human* or *divine*.

Human Testimony is allowed on both sides to be but *fallible*, and many times *contradictory*; and can prove *nothing certain*, much less that *contingent Events are certain*. Besides as *human Testimony* reaches properly unto *Facts only*, and as none, I suppose, ever pretended they have in *Fact* prevented what *will be*; so, no Certainty on their side of the Question can possibly arise from this Quarter.

As to the *Testimony of God*, all sides grant it to be *harmonious* and *infallible*; that what it declares to be *true*, cannot be *untrue*. But then for this very Reason, what it assures us *will be*, cannot *but be*, and *must be*; and so ceates to be *contingent*. Not to mention that Questions of *possibility* (as Dr. Waterland observes in another Controversy) must always take Place of Enquiries into *Scripture*. So that (as a worthy Correspondent justly remarks) " it is altogether *Supposing*, to lay, that any Words

“ Words of Scripture do contain such *absolute Prophecies* of FUTURE EVENTS, which “ yet are *supposed* CONTINGENT. For “ till the Notion can be made appear *possible*, “ it is (as he goes on) *begging the Question*, “ to say, the *Scriptures* contain such *absolute Prophecies*”. And that the Possibility cannot be demonstrated, neither from scripture *Declarations* nor from scripture *Prophecies*, I have, I think, sufficiently proved already in my *Essay*, p. 69, and 7. I’ll venture to transcribe the Paragraphs, and cast them into the Margin; tho’ I shou’d run the *Risque* of giving my worthy Brother another *surfeit*, or provoke his Reverend and learned Friend to tell the World again of my SOFT ECHO’S or ESSAY REPEATED. *

But

* “ It is not, I freely allow, any reasonable Objection “ against the received Notion of the Divine Prescience or “ Fore-knowledge, that it is *above* our *Reason*. But then “ there is a wide Difference between being *above* and *contrary* “ to *Reason*. If *Revelation* doth every where affirm, that the “ sinful Acts of the Creature’s Will, so far as it is *accountable*, “ are *free*, and what the Creature *might have prevented*, it can “ never be true from *Revelation* that they were *not free*, or “ what it *cou’d not have prevented*. A sinful Act or Action “ can no more be *free* and *not free* at the same time, than the “ Divine Being can be *holy* and *not holy*, *God* and *not God*. “ Therefore whatever *Revelation Says* or *Prophecies* of such “ Acts or Actions, it can never amount to this; that whilst “ they are *free*, they are *not free*. What, to be *free*, and “ [yet] to be *absolutely determined* to *one side*, and that before “ all Worlds! To be *free*, and yet to be as *unable* to Act “ otherwise, as to make *certain Knowledge* to be *uncertain*, “ or to make a *true Prediction false*! Necessity it self is not “ less *free* than such a *Freedom*”. p. 69, 73. *Essay*. so in another Place. “ Then

" Then as to what is insinuated concerning *Scripture Prophecies* ; I readily allow, that every such Prophecy is not only true, but infallibly true, in the Sense of the Prophecy. But then, is it not much safer for this very Reason, to suppose, that what is absolutely foretold, no longer depends upon the *Liberty* and *free Pleasure* of the Creature, whether it shall be or no ? Or, what doth yet depend upon the *Liberty or free Pleasure* of the Creature, whether it shall exist or not, is only *conditionally foretold*. If by an Action's being left to the *Freedom of Man's Will*, we mean, that it is left unto a *Principle*, which is *absolutely unfixed* unto either side as yet, but which has a *real Power* to fix it self either way ; and if by the *Subject* of an *infallible Prediction* or *[absoluta] Prophecy*, we intend something that is *absolutely fixed* one Way ; then we undertake to prove by *Scripture Prophecies*, that the *same Action or Event* may be both *fixed* and *unfixed* at the same time, or that a flat *Contradiction* is *true*. And so at this Rate of Arguing, I and you may both *widely differ* about these Things, and yet be both in the *Right and of one Mind*". p. 7, 8. *Essay*.

But if the *Truth* of their Assertion is not to be discovered any of the former Ways, it must be by **REASON**, or not at all : Which teaches us to draw one *Truth* from another by a *natural and just Method of Argument*. But now, if this Proposition [*It is possible to prevent what will be*] be the *Conclusion* ; what are the *Premises*, that must shew it ? Let them try the *Experiment* a thousand Times, and they will certainly find, the very *Arguments* which *prove* the *one*, *confute* the *other*. Witness these Gentlemen's *Mediums* from *absolute Predictions*, and *infallible Fore-knowledge* *.

These

* *Vid. Mr. N's Letter, p. 23, 24. Mr. B's Letter, p. 63, 64, 77, 78.*

These Gentlemen suppose there are *future Contingencies*; else how can God *foreknow* them? They are of Opinion, for Instance, that all those *Thoughts, Volitions, Words and Actions* for which we are *accountable*, were *free* and *contingent*, and yet *future*; what we had a *Power to prevent*, tho' they *certainly would be*. Now the Topics from *Reason* to make out this *marvelous Power*, must (I conceive) be some one or more of these *four*. Either they can shew that **THE PREVENTING WHAT WILL BE has** been done, or that it *will be* done, or *how it may be done*, or at least can assign some *valuable Reasons*, why such a *Power should be communicated to Man*.

But all, I presume, are agreed that none *have done it*. And yet if every *free Agent* had, in ten thousand Instances, the *Power*; is it not a little strange that not one of all the *Myriads* in the *Universe* should take it in his Head to *exert* this *Power*? If Mr. N. has any *Atchievements* of such a Kind to boast of; I hope he will not say, *he is but ONE of the many THOUSANDS, who have done the like*. He is, I durst aver, the *only* one (excepting, perhaps, his *Reverend and learned Friend*) *who ever attempted to perform such Wonders*.

But before we will allow them the *Advantage* of the old Proverb,

What *has been done*, *may be done*: Mr. B. and Mr. N. **HAVE prevented what WILL BE**: Therefore what *will be*, *may be prevented*

vented. Before we allow it, it is but reasonable (I say) that the *Evidence* of the *Facts* should bear some *Proportion* to the *Greatness* of the *Exploits*. It is but fit, they should certify the *Time* and *Place*, when and where they acquit themselves with so much *Dexterity*; and the rather, becaule to *prevent* what *will be*, is to make that it *will not be*; and then it would be *true* that it *will be*, and *true* that it *will not be*; *true* and *not true*.

As none *have* done it, so it is, I'm confident, beyond the *most janguine* Constitution to hope it ever *will be* done. Every Man stands convinced in his own Breast, that what *will be*, is no more to be *prevented*, than what *must be*. Was he told, it is a *future Contingency*, what *may not be*, tho' it *will be*; up, and try to *prevent* it. Would he not either *laugh* or *form*? Where is the Man that looks upon the most valuable Interest, as worth a *Straw*, that really depends upon this magical *Power* to *prevent* what *will be*?

Was it possible to be done, there must, doubtles, be a certain *Modus* or *Manner* for the doing it. But none ever had the *Vanity* to teach *HOW* it may be done. And yet if every *free Agent* *has* the *Power*, is it not a little marvellous, that not one of them should be either *conscious* of such a *Power*, or of the *way how* it may be *exercis'd*? If these Gentlemen have hit upon the *Secret*, tho' it mayn't be adviseable to impart the *Whole* of such a *beneficial Mystery* to the *World*; yet to communicate

municate so much, as may convince others, they have *actually* found this *Philosopher's Stone*, is but expedient, was it only to induce Mankind to bid up for the Knowledge of so surprizing an Art; How in the twinkling of an Eye, to turn what *will be* into what *will not be*.

As no one knows *how* to prevent what *will be*; neither can any shew, what *valuable Purposes* such a Power can serve. For after all our boasted Abilities to prevent such Events, yet still they *will be* notwithstanding, altogether the same, as if there had been no such Power to hinder them. Let it be once true that the unhappy Creature *will Sin* and be miserable; alas, what will his *Power* to prevent them avail! His *Sin* and *Damnation* are as *unavoidable* now, as if the contrary had been never so *impossible*. For being now known that they *will be*, they now *must be*, must infallibly be, these Gentlemen themselves being judges *. I do but think, with what hellish Shrieks and dispairing Cries this wretched World wou'd be filled, if Men were perswaded that all their Hopes of winning *HEAVEN*, or *escaping the Vengeance of ETERNAL FIRE*, did really depend upon the feeble *Power* of preventing what *will be*! Now what End the *Belief* of such a Power can serve, [which no Man ever *did*, or ever *will use*; that we

* Vid. *Mr. N's Letter*, p. 33. *Mr. B's Letter*, p. 63.

knew not how to use, and which cannot possibly serve any beneficial Purposes unto them that have it,] I cannot imagin, unless it be to make the Head giddy with gazing upon the airy Phantom, or the Body lean with wondring at it.

Having thus shewn, That the *Affirmative* of the Question *cannot be proved*; I shall now make it appear, That the *Contradiction* to it is *true and demonstrable*; Viz. *That it is impossible to prevent what will be*: Or, (according to the Title of my Letter) *That what will be, must be*; Or, *That future Contingencies are no Contingencies*.

This being the *Hinge* upon which the *whole Controversy* doth turn, the Reader will bear with me, if I put my *first Argument* into *Form*: By which means the *Sophistry*, if any, will be more easily *detected*; Or, if my Reasoning be *just and conclusive*, the *Force* of it (at least to Men of Letters) will be more clearly *discerned*. And this I shall the rather do, not only in Imitation of Mr. B's *Example*, who begins with a *Syllogism*, but because as Mr. N. impatiently expects my Arguments, so he hopes I will remember that *nothing but Demonstration will, as the case now stands, be accepted*. The Point to be proved, is,

That what *will be, must be*; and

Therefore is *not contingent*.

My Argument is This;

What *can't be prevented, must be*:

But what *will be, can't be prevented*:

Therefore what *will be, must be*.

The

The Major is self-evident : to The Minor I prove thus ;

If it be a *Contradiction* to prevent what *will* be, what *will* be can't be prevented : But it is a *Contradiction* to prevent what *will* be :

Therefore what *will* be, can't be prevented. Here again it is only the *Antecedent* that needs any Proof, which I thus demonstrate ;

To suppose it both *true* that an Event *will* be, and yet *not true* that it *will be*, is a *Contradiction*.

But to prevent what *will* be, supposes it both *true* that it *will* be, and *not true* that it *will* be :

Therefore to prevent what *will* be, is a *Contradiction*.

The *Truth* of the *Minor*, if it needs any further Evidence, may be thus made out ;

To prevent what *will* be, is to suppose first that it is *true* that it *will be* ; (otherwise you don't prevent what *will* be) and then that it is *not true* that it *will* *will be* : For if you prevent what *will* be, it is *now true* that it *will not be*. And if it be *now true* that it *will not be*, it is no longer *true* that it *will be*.

Thus you see, Sir, it is strictly demonstrable, that *what will be, must be* ; or, that *future Contingencies are no Contingencies* : And therefore that such *Events* as are both *future* and *contingent*, are a mere *Chimera*, a *Nonentity*, a *Contradiction* in *in adjecto*, Ideas

destroy one another, are no Object of Knowledge ; and consequently that the Foreknowledge these Gentlemen contend for, which supposes that an Event *will* be, and *Liberty* which supposes it *may not* be, cannot be asserted without a manifest *Contradiction*. Since both sides are agreed, if *contingent* Events be not *certain*, it is not *Knowledge*, much less any *Perfection* in Knowledge to view them as *certain*.

Besides, I would ask ; Why can't we *recall* what's *past* ? But because to *recall* it, is to make it *not past* ; and so it would be both *past* and *not past*. Why can't we *bind* what *is* ? But because to *bind* it, is to make that it *is not* ; and so it would be *true* that it *is*, and yet *true* that it *is not*. Why can't we *do* the thing that is *impossible* ? But because to *do* it, is to prove that it is *possible* ; and so it would be both *possible* and *impossible*. For the same Reason it is, that none *can prevent* what *will* be ; because to *prevent* it, is to make that it *will not* be ; and so *true* and *not true* that it *will be*.

Again, what *will be* is *certain*, by their own Acknowledgment . Now, if what is

* " What Appearance of a Contradiction, says Mr. N. is there in supposing that some Things " might be *hypothetically* " necessary (or *certain*, as I should rather chuse to call them) " and yet at the same time *contingent*, Append. p. 12." So Mr. B. pag. 75. " This Foreknowledge denotes the Cer- " tainty of the Event, that the Creature *will sin*." Again, p. " An Action foreknown, will — certainly — " come to pass."

certain may be prevented, then what is *certain* may *deceive* us ; and so there is no *sure* Dependence upon any Thing. Don't they strike at all Religion at once, whether *revealed* or *natural*, and let in a Flood of *Scepticism* upon us, when they contend that what is *certain*, *may not be* ?

What God *foreknows* will be, can't be prevented ; (they theinitives allow *.) And indeed if the *WILL* *might* or *cou'd* incline otherwise than God *foresew*, his *Fore-knowledge* (as has been observed from Mr. Clarkson, *Essay*, p. 75,) would not be *infallible* ; for that excludes not only *actual Error*, but a *Possibility* of it. But what *will be*, God *foreknows* will be, by the Confession of both Parties : Therefore what *will be*, can't be prevented.

“ *Foreknowledge*, in the Order of our Ideas, (as Mr. B. rightly observes) should be considered as *subsequent* to the *Truth* and *Reality* of the Event which is the Object of it ; so that—it is, says he, only because it will be, that it is foreknown.” p. 65. So Mr. N. “ A thing doth not, because it is known, come to pass ; but because it was to come

* ‘ An Event, says Mr. N. because it is *foreknown*, *must infallibly be*.’ *L. t.* p. 33. ‘ The Perfection of God's Knowledge, and his Infallibility, says Mr. B. make it a moral Impossibility that he should be deceived. And by consequence an Action foreknown by God will as certainly come to pass, as if it was pre-determin'd absolutely ; or so, as that in the physical, impulsive Sense it *must* and *cannot* *but be*, p. 18.

to pass, therefore it was foreknown". *Letter*, pag. 33. Now I argue thus; If the *Truth* and *Reality* be, that the Event *will be*; or, that the Thing *was to come to pass*; then a *Power* to prevent it, is a *Power* to turn *Truth* into *Falshood*, and *Reality* into an *Ens rationis*, or what *was* to come to pass, into what *shall never* come to pass.

Once more; That a *physical Necessity* destroys the *Freedom* of the *Will*, and is inconsistent with *Liberty*, these Gentlemen themselves allow *. But the *hypothetical Necessity* they contend for †, is to all Intents and Purposes, in this Controversy, the same with a *physical Necessity*, and destroys the *Freedom* of the *Will* as much; (or, which is all one, *supposes* it as much destroyed) and consequently is as inconsistent with *Liberty*. For, as what we *promise conditionally*, the *Condition* being *perform'd*, binds as much as if we had promised it *absolutely*; so what is *hypothetically* or *conditionally necessary*, the *Condition* being *supposed*, is as necessary *now*, as if it had been *absolutely necessary*; (for, by a *physical* they must mean an *absolute Necessity*, when they oppose it to what is an *hypothetical* or *conditional Necessity*.) Thus; Is it true? If God be *just*, a Day of Judgment is *necessary*: Then, on *Supposition* that he be *just*, a Day of Judgment is now as *necessary*,

* *Mr. B. p. 60. Mr. N. Let. pag. 30.*

† *Mr. B. p. 62. Mr. N. Let. p. 34.*

as if it had been in the most *absolute*, or (what they call) *physical Sense necessary*. Besides, what can we infer from their *physical Necessity* of Actions, against the *Freedom* of the Will, more than this, now they *must be*, they *cannot but be*? Why, the *Necessity* that may be drawn from God's *eternal Foreknowledge* of our Actions, which they plead for, and call ^{Mr. B.} *hypothetical*, implies as much, *viz.* That the ^{p. 78.} Actions thus foreknown will as certainly come to pass, as if in the *physical, impulsive Sense* they *must be*, and *cannot but be*. So that upon both Suppositions the *Liberty* of the Creature to *this or that*; to *act or not act*, is *equally gone*.

But it may be said, if *future Contingencies* be a *Contradiction*; if it can't be true of the same Event, at the same time, both that it *will be*, and yet *may not be*; if both can't be true, which of them is true, with respect to the *accountable Thoughts, Volitions, Words and Actions* of the rational Creature? Must we give up their *Contingency*, or must we give up their *Futurity or Certainty*? I have chosen the *latter*, and maintain that the *free Actions &c.* of the Creature were not always *future*, what *wou'd certainly be*, but *only possible* from Eternity, what *might or might not be*; and consequently, that God view'd them only as possible, and not as future. " For if these " two Things were really inconsistent, and " cou'd by no means be reconciled; it wou'd " follow, (say the greatest Advocates for that " Notion)

“ Notion) not, that Mens Actions were not
 “ free ; (for that wou’d destroy *all* Religion,
 “ and take away *all* the moral Attributes of
 “ God at once;) But on the other Side, it
 “ wou’d follow that *such free actions as*
 “ Mens are, and without which rational
 “ Creatures cou’d not be rational Creatures,
 “ were not the Objects of the Divine Fore-
 “ knowledge” [or were not future.] “ And
 “ in such Case, it wou’d be no more a Dimi-
 “ nation of God’s *Omniscience*, say they, not
 “ to *know* things impossible and contradictory
 “ to be known; then it is a Diminution of
 “ his *Omnipotence*, not to be able to *do* things
 “ impossible, and contradictory to be done”.*

And were we to err in this matter, it were
Essay, p. 30, 31. infinitely more safe (even in our fallen State)
 to err on the side of Liberty than *against* it.
 For to entertain my Reader again with
 what Mr. *Bliss* calls a *soft Echo* out of my
Essay (for who wou’d invent *new* Arguments
 for Invention sake, when *old* Arguments lie *un-
 answered*;) if we are *not free*, but *wholly pas-
 sive*, it can do us no hurt to *think* ourselvess free.
 What I am under a *Necessity* to *do* and *be*, I
 shall *do* and *be* notwithstanding; nay, this
very Belief that I am *free*, will be as *necessary*
 as any Thing else, with all the *afflictive*
Thoughts that arise from an *apprehended abuse*
 of my Freedom. But if we are *really free*,
 and think we have *no Freedom*, it may do us

* See Dr. S. Clarke’s *Sermons published by Dr. J. Clarke, vol. 1.*
 pag; 260, 261.

much

much Hurt, it may turn to our infinite Hurt, as it may tempt us to neglect that Part upon which Life and Immortality depend. Ay, it may not only prove an Injury to *ourselves*, but to the *World* about us, whilst those valuable Talents, which were given for the *publick Good*, are either wickedly employ'd against it, or slothfully buried, for want of a vigorous and timely Resistance against the Flesh, the *World*, and the Devil: Besides, the *abuse of our Liberty* in pleading against the *Principle of Liberty*, may betray the unthinking *World* with which we live, into an indolent and ruinous Stupidity, in the *Matters of eternal Life*, whilst they are led to commit the infinite *Concernments* of their *Souls* to the immediate and *sole Conduct* of the *Spirit* in the neglect of that Part upon which his promised *Help* and the *Success* of the whole depend. To mention nothing here of the innumerable temporal *Advantages* that particular Persons, private Families, or more *publick Societies* may lose; or the temporal *Evils* they may suffer by the unvirtuous *Inactivity*, or vicious *Compliances*, which the *Belief* of such a mechanick *passive Principle*, as the want of *Liberty* in the *Creature*, may introduce into the rational *World*.

The *Case* standing thus, it may'nt be amiss to look into the *Arguments*, whether from *Reason* or *Revelation*, which have induced so many learned Persons to give into this *absurd* and *contradictory Notion*, *The Certainty of contingent Events*; or that an *Action* may be *certainly future*, and yet *free*. C N. B.

N.B. The Publication of the *Second Part* of this *Appendix*, I have deferr'd a while, in expectation of Mr. MILLAR's further *Thoughts upon the Subject of the Divine Omnipotence*; that it might be as *complete* and *decisive* an *Answer*, as possible, to all the *Arguments* that have been offered, from either of the above *Topics*. There I shall have an Opportunity to *collect*, to *state*, and *refute* their most *plausible Reasonings*; and particularly to lay open the Fallacy of these that follow. As when they argue,

1^{stly}, That since it is in Fact true that such and such Actions *have been*, it must therefore have been *ever true*, that they *would be*.

2^{dly}, That to *foreknow* an Event any Time *before* it comes to pass, is attended with *as great Difficulties*, as an *eternal Foreknowledge* of it.

3^{dly}, If *all Events be not eternally certain*, *some Events must depend upon Will and Pleasure*.

4^{thly}, That the *Knowledge of a perfect Being cannot increase*, tho' the *Truths that are known be still increasing*.

5^{thly}, That tho' an Event *cannot be contingent and necessary*, yet it *may be contingent and certain*.

6^{thly}, That these Propositions, *It is true that such an Event will be*; *It is true that such an Event will not be*, are as really contradictory, as these; *It is true, it will be*; *it is not true, it will be*.

7^{thly}, That God cannot govern the *moral World with Wisdom*, unless all their *moral Actions were eternally certain*.

8^{thly}, That an Event may be contingent *in itself*, and yet not *so to the Divine Mind*.

9^{thly}, That because *we may know in Time*, what *another does*, and yet *not will it*; therefore God may know *from Eternity* what *Creatures do in Time*, tho' he *never decreed it*; and tho' there was then nothing but *his own Decree to know it from*.

10^{thly}, That the *Supposition of future Contingencies leaves the Divine Perfections as unspotted*, as if *no such Contingencies were supposed*.

Such like Subtilties from the Topic of *Reason*, besides several others that pretend to *Revelation*, the Reader will find particularly discuss'd in this *Second Part*, and their Sophistry exposed: which will well deserve the Consideration of all such, as desire to go to the Bottom of this nice, difficult, and important Subject.